Splash247: More boxes overboard: cargo securing is a chain of responsibility

Published by Splash247

The Paris and Tokyo MoUs’ cargo-securing inspection campaign highlights an enduring industry challenge: preventing container losses requires far more than compliant paperwork and sound lashings. Ports have to play their part, too. Captain Pradeep Chawla, the CEO of MarinePALS, writes for Splash Ports today.

The Paris and Tokyo Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control (PSC) have paid attention to cargo securing through their Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC). The campaign examines compliance with SOLAS requirements for the loading, stowage and securing of cargo units and cargo transport units. It is clearly important, but the safety questions it raises extend far beyond the inspection window.

The World Shipping Council estimates that 1,478 containers were lost at sea in 2025, more than double the 576 recorded in 2024. One major incident accounted for 640 of those losses, while extreme weather and fire remained leading causes. The figures remain tiny compared with the hundreds of millions of containers transported safely, but percentages do not describe the full consequences.

A container overboard can endanger crews and other vessels, damage the ship, disrupt schedules and expose the marine environment to plastics, chemicals or other pollutants. In shallow or coastal waters, locating and recovering containers can cost millions and continue for months, particularly when weather prevents salvage operations. Cargo loss is therefore not simply a claims issue. It is a safety, environmental and operational failure.

That is why the CIC is relevant. Port State Control officers use a common questionnaire during routine inspections. They check whether an approved Cargo Securing Manual is on board, whether its instructions cover the stowage situations found on the ship, and whether relevant officers understand stack weights, tier-weight distribution and structural limits. They also examine verified gross mass data, the quantity and condition of securing devices, bridge visibility and compliance with heavy-weather procedures. Deficiencies may be recorded and serious failures may lead to detention.

Beyond the lashing system

Yet the campaign’s greatest value will come if the industry treats it as more than a three-month compliance exercise. The immediate cause of a container loss may be failure of the lashing system, but the chain of responsibility begins much earlier.

It starts with accurate information and a safe stowage plan. Commercial demands can lead to containers being accepted close to departure. However, late cargo must still be positioned correctly, and heavy units must not be placed where they create unacceptable stack loads. Officers need sufficient time to check each stack in the loading computer as soon as the plan is received. If the calculation identifies an unsafe arrangement, containers may have to be restowed. That has a cost, but sailing with inadequate securing can cost far more.

The loss from the President Eisenhower illustrates the danger. According to the US National Transportation Safety Board, incorrect weights were manually entered for 39 containers before the vessel sailed in 2024. Their actual verified gross masses were between 18.3 and 22.2 tonnes higher than the figures used for planning. The resulting overweight, reverse-stratified stacks exceeded limits and the securing equipment failed. Twenty-three containers went overboard and ten more were damaged. The episode shows how one shoreside data failure can travel through a digital planning system and emerge as a physical casualty at sea.

Seafarers are frequently the final defence against such failures, but they cannot provide that defence through vigilance alone. They need reliable information, realistic time and the authority to question a plan. They must also understand what the Cargo Securing Manual does and does not guarantee. Lashing arrangements are calculated for assumed conditions; the ship’s actual loading condition, equipment condition and voyage environment will never be identical to those assumptions. Officers must be able to interpret the limits and examine the calculated forces for the cargo actually carried.

Voyage planning is another part of the chain. Weather-routing services are often asked to optimise arrival time and fuel consumption. Safety may require a different answer: alter course, reduce speed or accept a later estimated arrival to avoid dangerous seas. Very large container ships can appear invulnerable, but casualty reports repeatedly show that the vessels that lost containers overboard or had a collapse of the container stacks on board were  encountering high waves and severe motions. A schedule cannot be allowed to override the conditions on which the securing arrangement depends.

Equipment condition is equally important. A large vessel carries thousands of twistlocks, lashing bars, turnbuckles and fixed fittings. Annual surveys are necessary, but they cannot replace routine inspection by people who know what wear, corrosion, deformation, incompatibility and poor lubrication look like. The practical question is whether crews have enough time to make those checks amid rapid turnarounds and frequent port calls. If the answer is no, the problem is organisational as much as individual.

Training is the final barrier

This brings us to training. The CIC asks whether officers are familiar with the manual and whether procedures are followed. Familiarity cannot be created by a signature on a familiarisation form. It requires learning that connects the manual with the loading computer, the equipment on deck and decisions made in deteriorating weather. It must also be refreshed. Crew changes, vessel transfers and long intervals between formal courses can leave knowledge uneven precisely when confident intervention is needed.

Digital training can help by bringing short, role-specific lessons and assessments to seafarers on board. At MarinePALS, we have developed three training videos addressing the prevention of containers being lost overboard.  They are not a  substitute for adequate manning, sound procedures, maintained equipment or a safety-first commercial culture. An easy to use and engaging training content adds another  essential barrier within a larger system.

The Paris and Tokyo MoUs say the campaign is intended to collect data on compliance, with findings potentially submitted to the IMO. Those results should help identify where the system is weak. Shipowners should not wait for another inspection campaign. They should routinely review plans and manuals, test officers’ practical understanding, examine securing inventories and maintenance records, and discuss the decisions expected when cargo data or weather creates doubt.

Passing an inspection is important, but it is not the real measure of success. The real test comes at sea, when the vessel rolls, the schedule is under pressure and a trained seafarer must decide whether the plan remains safe. The industry’s objective should be simple: not merely fewer deficiencies, but fewer boxes overboard.